We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is either 0 or 1, and aim to design truthful allocation mechanisms (without money) that maximize welfare and are fair. For the case that players have submodular valuations with dichotomous marginals, we design such a deterministic truthful allocation mechanism. The allocation output by our mechanism is Lorenz dominating, and consequently satisfies many desired fairness properties, such as being envy-free up to any item (EFX), and maximizing the Nash Social Welfare (NSW). In contrast, even dropping all fairness requirements, there is no truthful allocation mechanism (without money) that maximizes welfare when players have XOS valuations with dichotomous marginals.
Introduction
A central problem in Algorithmic Game Theory is the problem of allocating indivisible goods among players with private preferences. This problem is particularly challenging in settings in which utilities cannot be transferred between players (no money). One consideration in allocating the items is the economic efficiency of the allocation, as we want the best for society as a whole. Another consideration is fairness of the allocation, because in the absence of money, there is no other way for the players to evenly share the welfare generated by the efficient allocation.
Thus, in this work we design allocation mechanisms that enjoy desirable properties, related to their economic efficiency, to fairness of the allocation, and to incentive compatibility (truthfulness). Importantly, we consider only settings without money, so a mechanism defines an allocation rule, but does not involve a payment rule, as there are no payments. With general valuations, even without any fairness properties, the VCG mechanism is the unique truthful welfare-maximizing mechanism, and it requires payments. Consequently, the focus of our work is on instances in which the valuation functions of the agents are restricted, and specifically, have the dichotomous marginals property. We say that a valuation function f has dichotomous marginals (or for brevity, we simply say that f is dichotomous) if for every set S of items and every additional item a, the marginal value of a relative to S is either 0 or 1. Namely, f (S ∪ a) − f (S) ∈ {0, 1}.
The study of fairness with dichotomous preferences was initiated by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [10] , with additional extensive research of such preferences in various settings (see e.g. [11, 39, 24, 12, 30, 37] ). The above references provide multiple examples of situations that can be modeled using dichotomous preferences. Next we provide another example that involves constraints not captured by prior work. Consider a setting where the agents are arts students seeking work as museum guides. The items are different shifts in which the students can work as guides in the local arts museum. Suppose that among the shifts (or combinations of shifts) that are feasible for a given student in a given month (for example, one student cannot work on weekends, another student can work at most two shifts a week, etc.), the student may wish to work for as many shifts as possible during the month, but other than that is indifferent to the exact choice of shifts (as long as the combination of shifts is feasible for the student). A model that first-order approximates this setting is one in which the valuation function of a student is modeled as being dichotomous. 1 The allocation problem is to assign students to shifts. Economic efficiency may correspond to filling as many shifts as possible. Fairness may correspond to trying to equalize the number of shifts that each student receives (subject to the feasibility constraints). Incentive compatibility means that it is a dominant strategy for a student to report her true valuation function to the museum -providing an incorrect report cannot lead to a situation in which she receives a bundle of shifts of higher value to her.
We now provide an overview of our main results. Some definitions and technicalities are omitted from this overview, but can be found in Section 2.
We consider settings with a finite set M of m indivisible and non-identical items. There is a set of n ≥ 2 players (a.k.a. agents), denoted by V = [n], with each player v ∈ V having a valuation function f v over sets of items. The value (or utility) of player v for a set S ⊆ M is denoted by f v (S). We always assume that any valuation f is normalized (f (∅) = 0) and non-decreasing (f (S) ≤ f (T ) for S ⊆ T ⊆ M ). Given an allocation A, we use A v to denote the set of items allocated to player v.
One question that we ask in this work is what is the largest class of dichotomous valuation functions for which one has a truthful deterministic allocation mechanism that enjoys good economic efficiency and fairness properties. Before presenting our results, let us briefly discuss its various ingredients.
Classes of valuation functions. The dichotomous versions of some simple classes of valuation functions were considered in previous work (e.g., unit demand (matching) [10] , additive [37] and 0/1 valued sets [12] ). We consider here the hierarchy of complement-free valuation functions introduced in [32] , whose four highest classes (in order of containment) are gross substitutes (GS), submodular, XOS, and subadditive (recall that both unit demand and additive are gross substitutes). For valuations with dichotomous marginals, it can be shown that every submodular function is in fact a Matroid Rank Function (MRF), and hence also gross substitutes. We note that valuation functions may be used to express not only the preferences of the players, but also constraints imposed by the allocator. In the museum example above, the museum may impose a restriction that no student can work in two shifts in the same day, and another restriction that no student can work in five shifts in the same week. If a student has an additive valuation function, then incorporating these constraints into her valuation function makes it submodular.
Economic efficiency. We wish our allocations to maximize welfare, where the welfare of allocation A is defined as v∈V f v (A v ). Restricting attention to non-redundant allocations (no item can be removed from a set allocated to a player without decreasing its value), in the setting of dichotomous valuations, maximizing welfare is equivalent allocating the maximum possible number of items. Hence maximizing welfare can serve as a measure of economic efficiency not only from the point of view of the players, but also from the point of view of the items (as in the museum guides example, where it is in the interest of the museum to fill as many shifts as possible).
Fairness. For allocation mechanisms without money it is customary to impose some fairness requirements. They come in many flavors. Safety guarantees (such as proportionality, maximin share 2 ) promise the player a certain minimum value, based only on the valuation function of the given player and no matter what the valuation functions of other players are. Envy-freeness guarantees (envy free up to one good (EF1), envy free up to any good (EFX)), ensure that every player v is at least as happy with her own bundle of goods as she would be with the bundle received by any other player (perhaps up to one good (EF1), or up to any good (EFX)). Egalitarian guarantees (lexicographically maximal allocations, Lorenz-dominating allocations, maximizing Nash social welfare (NSW)) attempt to equalize the utilities of all players (to the extent possible, given their valuation functions). Not all fairness notions are attainable in all settings, and in addition, there are settings in which two fairness notions that are attainable are not attainable simultaneously. For this reason, in our work we do not fix one particular fairness notion, but rather attempt to achieve a good mix of fairness properties.
Truthfulness. We wish our mechanisms to have the property that reporting her true valuation function is a (weakly) dominant strategy for every player. That is, for every player v, whatever the reports of other players are, if player v reports a valuation function different than f v , the allocation she gets cannot have higher value to her, compared to the allocation when she reports f v .
We now return to our question concerning the largest class of dichotomous valuation functions for which one has a truthful deterministic allocation mechanism that enjoys good economic efficiency and fairness properties. We address this question in the framework of the hierarchy of complement-free valuation functions defined in [32] . Our first main result shows that if the dichotomous valuation functions are submodular, then a deterministic mechanism that we refer to as prioritized egalitarian (PE) indeed satisfies the above requirements.
Theorem 1 The prioritized egalitarian (PE) mechanism has the following properties when players have submodular dichotomous valuations:
1. Being truthful is a dominant strategy.
2. When players are truthful the allocation is welfare maximizing. 3 . When players are truthful, the allocation of the mechanism is a Lorenz dominating allocation, and consequently it enjoys additional fairness properties, including maximizing Nash social welfare, and being envy-free up to any item (EFX). If furthermore, the valuations are additive dichotomous, the allocation gives every player at least her maximin share.
If the valuations of players have succinct representations (that allow computation of function values in polynomial time)
, then the mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time.
In contrast, we show that if the valuation functions belong to the class XOS (one level higher than submodular in the hierarchy of [32] ), then there is no truthful allocation mechanism (neither deterministic nor randomized) that maximizes welfare, even if one disregards all fairness considerations. See Appendix D.
The PE mechanism is based on first proving that in the setting of submodular dichotomous valuation functions there always is a Lorenz dominating allocation (exact definitions will follow, but at this point the reader may think as a Lorenz dominating allocation as one that both maximizes welfare and equalizes as much as possible the number of items received by each player). The PE mechanism imposes a priority order σ among players, and chooses a non-redundant Lorenz dominating allocation (namely, it does not allocate items that give 0 marginal value to the player receiving them), breaking ties among Lorenz dominating allocations in favor of higher priority players. Proving economic efficiency and fairness properties for this mechanism is straightforward, given the fact that the output allocation is Lorenz dominating. The main technical content in the proof of Theorem 1 (beyond the proof that a Lorenz dominating allocation exists) is to show that the PE mechanism is truthful (for players with submodular dichotomous valuations).
Armed with the above results for dichotomous valuations, we study whether our positive results are robust in face of slight violations of the dichotomous assumption. For simplicity of the presentation, consider the special case of additive dichotomous valuations. The dichotomous assumption models situations in which items of value 1 are "desirable" whereas items of value 0 are not desirable, and an agent is indifferent among items that she finds desirable (and likewise, indifferent among items that she finds undesirable). A natural relaxation for the undesirable items is to allow them to have arbitrary non-positive value. It turns out that the PE mechanism (and other natural mechanisms that are not required to allocate all items) is robust to this relaxation of 0, because it only allocates an item to an agent if the agent reports a positive marginal value for the item. Consequently, we shall not bother with this relaxation (that only complicates terminology but has no effect on the results), and assume that undesirable items always have a value of 0. A natural relaxation for the desirable items is to allow each of them to have an arbitrary value in the range [1, 1 + ǫ], for some small ǫ > 0 (where the case ǫ = 0 corresponds to dichotomous valuations). Consequently, a player can attribute slightly different values to her desirable items, and can strictly prefer one desirable item over another. We require ǫ to be sufficiently small so that the preference order that an agent has over sets of desirable items remains in favor of the larger set. We refer to this setting as that of ǫ-leveled valuations 3 . More generally, we have the notion of ǫ-dichotomous valuations that can be applied also to submodular valuations (and not just additive ones), though we defer the formal definition to Section 2.
Let ρ = 1 1+ǫ . If the players truthfully report their ǫ-dichotomous valuations, one may round the value of each set down to the nearest integer, and by this obtain dichotomous valuations. Thereafter, one may allow the PE mechanism to choose an allocation, and obtain all the guarantees of the PE mechanism up to a multiplicative factor of ρ. Likewise, no player can gain more than a 1 + ǫ factor in her utility by providing an incorrect report to this mechanism (the player cannot increase the number of desirable items that she receives, but she might possibly be able to manipulate the identity of these items), and hence the mechanism may be referred to as being ǫ-truthful. However, strictly speaking, this mechanism is not truthful (for ǫ-dichotomous valuations), because a player who cares about small differences in her utility may indeed find it beneficial to misreport her valuation function. Moreover, once players misreport their valuation functions, the welfare generated by the resulting allocation might be much smaller than the maximum welfare.
It turns out that there are fundamental limits on truthful mechanisms for ǫ-dichotomous valuations. For the case of submodular (in fact, even just unit demand) ǫ-dichotomous valuations we show that no truthful allocation mechanism (neither deterministic nor randomized) can approximate the maximum welfare with a ratio better than 1 2 . When restricting attention to ǫ-leveled valuations, there are deterministic truthful mechanisms that generate at least a ρfraction of the maximum welfare (e.g., let every player in order of priority select all items that she desires among remaining items). However, we show that for ǫ-leveled valuations, there is no deterministic truthful mechanism that allocates all desirable items and satisfies the following weak fairness requirement: for settings with n players, if a player reports n items as desirable, the player receives at least one of the reported items. Moreover, there is no truthful allocation mechanism (neither deterministic nor randomized) that maximizes welfare when valuations are ǫ-leveled.
The above impossibility results lead us to consider randomized allocation mechanisms for additive ǫ-dichotomous valuations. We require our randomized mechanisms to be truthful in expectation (TIE): misreporting a valuation function cannot increase the expected utility of a player. TIE is a property that holds before the random allocation mechanism tosses its coins. In addition, our mechanisms preserve the ǫ-truthfulness property mentioned above, and this property holds ex-post (even after the player sees the coin tosses of the mechanism). As to economic efficiency and fairness properties, we relax them, being content with a 1 1+ǫ approximations of them. Importantly, we require these guarantees to hold in an ex-post manner, namely, for every realization of the randomness of the underlying randomized allocation mechanism.
Our second main result concern a new randomized allocation mechanism that we refer to as M L .
Theorem 2 Let ǫ < 1 nm 3 and ρ = 1 1+ǫ . When all n players have ǫ-leveled valuations, the randomized allocation mechanism M L has the following properties:
1. M L is truthful in expectation and ex-post ǫ-truthful.
2. If all players are truthful, then the allocation output by M L provides at least a ρ-fraction of the maximum welfare (ex-post).
3. M L guarantees every truthful player at least a ρ-fraction of her maximin share, and is ρ-EF1 (envy free up to one good, up to a multiplicative factor of ρ). These guarantees hold ex-post. Moreover, the expected utility received by a truthful player is at least a 1 n -fraction of her value for the grand bundle of all items (i.e., proportional in expectation).
The mechanism runs in polynomial time.
Our randomized mechanism M L is based on the PE mechanism. It first rounds down all reported values to the nearest integer, thus obtaining dichotomous additive valuations. As simply running the PE mechanism on the rounded valuation does not create a truthful mechanism, we modify the mechanism to obtain truthfulness using some randomization. This randomization involves two components. One, that is very natural from a fairness perspective, is to choose a priority order σ uniformly at random (unlike the deterministic PE mechanism for which σ is fixed in advance). The other component, a trick that we introduce and that may be of value also elsewhere, is to hold out at random either one or two of the items. For the items not held out, referred to here as the main items, M L allocates them using the PE mechanism with priority order σ. As to the items held out, M L allocates them using a priority based mechanism, but with a priority order σ ′ that is the reverse of σ. For the first item held out, among the players that desire it (if there is any), the player with highest priority (according to σ ′ ) receives it, and her priority is reduced to being last. If there is also a second item that is held out, then it is allocated according to this new priority order.
Let us briefly explain the main argument why mechanism M L is truthful in expectation. Consider player v for which D v is the set of all desirable items of non-zero value (hence of value in the range [1, 1 + ǫ] ). Truthfulness of the deterministic mechanism PE (for dichotomous valuations) implies that for every outcome of the random coin tosses of M L , reporting her true D v maximizes the number of desirable items that i receives. Hence the most that v can gain by a non-truthful report is an added value of ǫ|D v | ≤ ǫm ≤ 1 nm 2 . Hence even if there is probability of only 1 nm 2 of losing a desirable item by misreporting, non-truthful reporting becomes inferior to truthful reporting. And indeed, the allocation rule for the held-out items is designed such that non-truthful reporting causes a loss of a desirable item with high enough probability, making such a report dominated. We remark that the proof of truthfulness does not require σ ′ to be the reverse of σ. The fact that one priority order is the reverse of the other is only used in establishing fairness properties of M L (item 3 in Theorem 2).
More details concerning our results appear in subsequent sections. Due to space limitations, most proofs (including the statements of some lemmas) are deferred to the appendix.
Related Work
Dichotomous preferences: The study of dichotomous preferences was initiated by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (BM) [10] . They consider dichotomous matching problems (unit demand preferences) and suggest the randomized Lorenz mechanism to get a probabilistic allocation that is fair in expectation. While the paper of BM focuses on unit-demand valuations, we consider the more general class of submodular valuations, and our focus is on deterministic allocations. Dichotomous preferences have been further studied extensively in the literature for mechanisms without money [11, 24, 12, 30, 37] , auction design (with private value scaling) [5, 34] and exchanges [39, 4] .
Maybe the most closely related to our paper is the work of Ortega [37] which studies the Multi-unit assignment problem (MAP) with dichotomous valuations. MAP is a sub-class of the submodular class that slightly extends additive (but does not contain unit demand, for example). The paper suggests picking a fractional "welfarist" solution (vector of fractional utilities) that is Lorenz dominating among those that maximize welfare. Being fractional, this corresponds to a randomized allocation mechanism rather than a deterministic one. Consequently, the notion of truthfulness used is that of being truthful in expectation. Moreover, the notion of truthfulness is further restricted there, and only allows to conceal desired items in the report, but not to report undesirable items as desired. Under this notion, the solution is group strategy proof. In contrast, the larger class of submodular dichotomous valuations considered in our work contains unit demand dichotomous valuations, for which no allocation mechanism that maximizes welfare can be group strategy proof [10] . Being Lorenz dominating, the fractional solution enjoys multiple fairness properties. The work of [37] does not explicitly address the question of to what extent these fairness properties are preserved ex-post, after the fractional solution is rounded to an integer solution.
Fairness: The literature of fairness is too extensive to survey in this paper, so we only mention the most related papers. For a general introduction see [14, 13, 35] .
Three types of fairness criteria are commonly studied: Maximin: Budish [15] has introduced the notion of maximin fairness. Kurokawa et al. [31] showed that even for the simple case of additive valuations, the maximin share cannot be given to everyone simultaneously. The valuations used in the proof are ǫ-leveled, implying that we cannot aim for exact maximin fairness even for players with ǫ-leveled valuations. Constant approximations to the maximin share were presented in [25, 27] .
EF1: Envy-free up to one good (EF1) was defined by Budish [15] . EF1 allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently [33] . Bei et al. [9] studied the price of fairness for indivisible goods in terms and welfare, showing that welfare loss might be as large as Θ(n) if valuations are not restricted. Caragiannis et al. [17] proved that for positive additive utilities, a rule based on maximizing Nash social welfare finds an allocation that is both EF1 and Pareto optimal. Barman et al. [7] developed a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for finding allocations that are EF1 and Pareto efficient. When the valuations are bounded the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
EFX: Envy-free up to any good (EFX) was introduced by Caragiannis et al. [17] . Plaut and Roughgarden [38] showed existence of EFX allocations when there are two players. They also exhibited an instance with two players and items with zero marginals, where no allocation is both Pareto optimal and EFX. Recent papers [16, 18] showed that for additive players there exists an EFX allocation that allocates almost all the items. Amanatidis et al. [3] showed that when items have only two possible values then NSW maximization implies EFX, and therefore EFX allocations always exist.
Truthful Mechanisms with money: The problem of designing a truthful mechanism that maximizes welfare with money is substantially different than without money, and can be solved by the VCG mechanism for general settings. Several papers have studied truthful mechanisms of indivisible goods with payments that aim for fairness and welfare guarantees [8, 20, 26, 29, 23, 28, 41] .
Truthful Fair Mechanisms without money: Amanatidis et al. [2] characterized deterministic truthful allocation mechanisms for the case of two additive players (with unrestricted values), implying strong fairness impossibilities. Amanatidis et al. [1] studied deterministic truthful allocation mechanisms for approximating the maximin share for additive valuations. Several papers [19, 36] have presented randomized truthful allocation mechanisms that are fair in expectation. Segal-Halevi [40] studied truthful allocation mechanisms where items can be shared (fractionally allocated) between agents, and showed that the number of shared items can be made smaller than the number of agents.
Model and Preliminaries
We consider settings with a finite set M of m indivisible and non-identical items. There is a set of n ≥ 2 players, denoted by V = [n], with each player v ∈ V having a valuation function f v over sets of items. The value (or utility) of player v for a set S ⊆ M is denoted by f v (S). We always assume that a valuation function f is normalized (f (∅) = 0) and non-decreasing
Valuations
In this paper we consider several classes of valuation functions. The marginal value of item a ∈ M given a set S ⊆ M is defined to be f (a|S) = f (S ∪ {a}) − f (S). Next we define some properties of valuation functions we will be using: • A valuation function f is a Matroid Rank Function (MRF) if there exists a matroid 4 for which for every set S it holds that f (S) is the rank of set S in the matroid.
• For ǫ ≥ 0, a submodular valuation function f is ǫ-dichotomous if the marginal value of any item is either 0 or belong to the set
for every set S ⊆ M and item a ∈ M .
• For ǫ ≥ 0, an additive valuation function f that is ǫ-dichotomous is called ǫ-leveled.
A valuation function f is submodular dichotomous if it is both submodular and dichotomous. It is known (follows from the matroid exchange property) that a function is submodular dichotomous if and only if it is a rank function of a matroid, thus, for brevity we will often refer to a submodular dichotomous valuation function as an MRF valuation. Recall that unitdemand valuations are submodular, so submodular dichotomous valuations can in particular capture the dichotomous matching setting of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [10] . They also capture the setting of Ortega [37] . An interesting special case of submodular dichotomous valuations are such valuations that are additive. A valuation function f is additive dichotomous if it is both additive and dichotomous. Note that a 0-leveled valuation is simply an additive dichotomous valuation.
For player v with a submodular valuation
and we call the set D v the demand of v (and due to additivity the value of every item in the demand is independent of other items the player receives). For item a ∈ D v we say that player v desires (or demands, or wants) item a.
Allocations
We consider mechanisms to allocate items in M to the players. As we assume that utilities cannot be transfered and there is no money, a mechanism will only specify the allocation function, mapping valuation functions to allocations. We will mostly consider deterministic allocation functions.
An
is an assignment of items to players, possibly leaving some items unallocated. We denote by A v the set of items allocated to player v under allocation A. The value (or utility) of allocation A for player v that has valuation function
and an allocation is welfare maximizing if there is no other allocation with larger welfare. Note that a welfare maximizing allocation is Pareto optimal. An allocation A is called non-redundant for f if it does not give any player an item for which she has no marginal value, that is, for any player v and any item a
, or equivalently, every strict subset of A v has strictly lower value for v. We note that for MRF valuation f , for any non-redundant set S it holds that f (S) = |S|. A non-redundant allocation has maximal size with respect to f , if there is no other non-redundant allocation with respect to f that allocates more items. We say that an allocation is reasonable for f if it both non-redundant and has maximal size with respect to f . Note that if all players have dichotomous additive valuations, any reasonable allocation is welfare maximizing. Additionally, if players have ǫdichotomous valuations, any reasonable allocation gets at least 1 1+ǫ -fraction of the maximum welfare allocation (Observation 24).
Mechanisms
An allocation mechanism (without money) maps profiles of valuations to an allocation. That is, given valuation functions f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) an allocation mechanism M outputs an allocation
. . , f n ). We sometimes abbreviate and call an allocation mechanism simply a mechanism. A mechanism asks each player to report a valuation function, getting a report f ′ v from each player v, and allocates the items by running the mechanism on the reported
We are interested in mechanisms that are truthful, that is, give players incentives to report their valuation function truthfully. A mechanism M is truthful if for every player v, reporting f v is a weakly dominant strategy (maximizes her value given any reports of the other players).
We say that a mechanism M has property P if for any input f , its output allocation A = M(f ) has property P . For example, a mechanism is reasonable if for any f the allocation
Fairness
The list below presents standard fairness conditions that one may desire.
1. The maximin share of a player i with valuation f i , denoted by maximin(f i ), is the maximum over all partitions of the items into n disjoint bundles S 1 , . . . , S n of the minimum value according to f i of a bundle, min j∈[n] f i (S j ). The optimal partition depends on f i . An allocation that gives each player a bundle of value at least as high as his maximin share is called maximin fair.
2. An allocation is envy free (EF) if every player prefers the bundle that he himself received over every bundle that some other player received. Formally, for every i ∈ [n], let f i denote the valuation function of player i and let A i denote the bundle received by player i. Then an allocation is envy free if for all i, j ∈ [n] it holds that
In the context of allocation of indivisible goods, envy freeness is incompatible with economic efficiency. For example, if there is only one item and two players who desire it, the only envy free solution is not to allocate the item at all. Consequently, the literature considers the following relaxed versions of envy freeness:
(a) Envy free up to one good (EF1). The envy free condition is relaxed as follows: for
. EFX is a stronger property than EF1.
Given an allocation
. . , f n (A n )), and the sorted utility vector s A,f is a vector whose entries are those of u A,f sorted from smallest to largest. We impose a lex-min order among sorted vectors, where s 1 > lexmin s 2 if there is some k ∈ [n] such that s 1 (k) > s 2 (k) and for every 1 ≤ j < k we have that s 1 (j) = s 2 (j). Given the valuation functions f , an allocation A is maximal in the lex-min order if for every other allocation A ′ we have that s A,f ≥ lexmin s A ′ ,f . We refer to such an allocation as a lex-min allocation. Given f , a lex-min allocation always exists (as the set of allocations is finite).
4. Using notation as above, we also impose a Lorenz domination partial order over sorted vectors, where s 1 ≥ Lorenz s 2 if for every k ∈ [n], the sum of first k entries in s 1 is at least as large as the sum of first k entries in s 2 . A Lorenz dominating allocation is an allocation that Lorenz dominates every other allocation. Given the valuation functions f , a Lorenz dominating allocation need not exist, but if it does exist, then it is also a lex-min allocation.
5.
Given valuation functions f , an allocation A will be referred to as min-square if it maximizes welfare ( i f i (A i )), and conditioned on maximizing welfare, it minimizes
A min-square allocation always exists. It is an allocation that minimizes the variance of utilities among players, conditioned on maximizing the welfare. 6 . Given valuation functions f , an allocation A is said to maximize the Nash Social Welfare (NSW) if it maximizes the product i f i (A i ). (Formally, such an allocation maximizes NSW relative to the disagreement point of not allocating any item.) Given f , a maximum NSW allocation always exist, though it need not maximize welfare.
Each of the notions of maximin share, EF1 and EFX can be relaxed to hold only up to an multiplicative term of α ∈ [0, 1], and we use the notation α-maximin, α-EF1 and α-EFX to denote these approximate fairness notions in which a player get at least α-fraction of the appropriate share (see Section A in the appendix for formal definitions).
Submodular Dichotomous Valuations
In this section we consider valuation functions that are both dichotomous and submodular. It is known (follows from the matroid exchange property) that a function is submodular dichotomous if and only if it is a rank function of a matroid. Consequently, for brevity, we shall refer to submodular dichotomous valuations as MRFs (Matroid Rank Functions).
In this section we prove our first main result:
Theorem 3 There exists an allocation mechanism for players with MRF valuations with the following properties:
1. For players with MRF valuations, being truthful is a dominant strategy.
2. When players are truthful the allocation is welfare maximizing.
3. When players are truthful, the allocation of the mechanism is a Lorenz dominating allocation, it is lex-min, it is min-square, and maximizes NSW. It is also EFX (and hence also EF1). If furthermore, the valuations are additive dichotomous, the allocation is also maximin fair.
If the players have MRF valuations with succinct representations, then the mechanism can
be implemented in polynomial time.
One aspect of the proof of the theorem involves showing that a Lorenz dominating allocation exists. Lorenz domination can be shown to imply the desired welfare and fairness properties. However, simply picking an arbitrary Lorenz dominating allocation does not guarantee truthfulness (see Example 4) . Hence a major part of the proof of the theorem is to show that a particular choice of a Lorenz dominating solution does ensure truthfulness.
Example 4 Consider a setting with items a 1 and a 2 , and players p 1 , p 2 and p 3 , with additive dichotomous valuations, where every player wants all items. Every allocation in which two of the players get an item each is a Lorenz dominating allocation. Consider a mechanism that for i ∈ {1, 2} gives item a i to player p i , unless player p 3 reports that she desires only a 1 , and in this case p 3 rather than p 1 gets a 1 . This mechanism only picks Lorenz dominating allocations, but is not truthful (p 3 can gain by concealing the fact that she also desires a 2 ).
Lorenz Dominating Allocations
The following proposition puts together several observations regarding fairness properties of Lorenz dominating allocations, most (if not all) of which are known. In view of Propositions 5 and 6, we choose Lorenz domination as our fairness requirement. As we shall see in Theorem 7, in our setting of MRF valuations, a Lorenz dominating allocation always exists, and often, more than one such allocation exists. For example, if there is only one item and all players desire it, then allocating the item to any of the players is a Lorenz dominating allocation. We now wish to address truthfulness of the allocation mechanism. This will be achieved by implementing a particular choice among Lorenz dominating allocations. This choice will be guided by two principles.
Proposition 5 Given any (normalized and monotone) valuation functions
The first principle is that the allocation will be non-redundant. Namely, for every player, the allocation is such that the set of items given to the player does not contain redundant items that give the player no marginal value. In our setting, this is equivalent to requiring that the set of items received by a player forms an independent set in the matroid underlying the MRF of the player.
The second principle is that of imposing some arbitrary priority order among the players, fixed independently of their valuations. Among the possibly many Lorenz-dominating allocations that may exist, we choose one that favors the higher priority players as much as possible. Still, there may be several different allocations that satisfy this condition, but any two of them will be equivalent in terms of the utilities that the players (who have MRF valuation functions) derive from them. W.l.o.g., let the priority order be such that player i has priority i (player 1 has highest priority, player n has lowest priority). A convenient mathematical way to reason about the priority order is as follows. Add to the instance n auxiliary items a 1 , . . . , a n . For every player i ∈ [n], pretend that the marginal value of item a i is i n 2 to player i (regardless of any other items that player i may hold), and the marginal value of a j with j = i is 0. With the auxiliary items,
They are not MRFs (because the marginals of auxiliary items are not in {0, 1}), but they are still gross substitutes (because each f ′ i is a sum of a gross substitute function f i on the original items and a gross substitute function on the auxiliary items). In every welfare maximizing allocation, for every i ∈ [n], item a i is given to player i. Given the auxiliary item, when allocating the original items, a Lorenz dominating allocation will break ties in favor of higher priority players, as they derive less value from the auxiliary items.
Theorem 7
Given MRF valuations f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) and the auxiliary items (giving rise to
by all Lorenz dominating allocations. Removing the auxiliary items from the Lorenz dominating allocation results in an allocation A that is Lorenz dominating with respect to the original MRF valuations.
Proof. Consider the following function W that we shall refer to as a welfare function. Given a set M of indivisible items, a set V of n agents, and valuation functions f 1 , . . . , f n , the function W is a set function defined over the players. Given a set S ⊆ V , W (S) is the maximum welfare attainable by the set S. Namely,
. . , f ′ n ) (the MRFs, augmented with the auxiliary items), the respective welfare function W is submodular. Dutta and Ray [21] prove that if W is submodular, then a Lorenz dominating allocation exists. Consequently, with our valuation functions f ′ , a Lorenz dominating allocation A ′ exists.
Uniqueness of the vector of utilities is a consequence of the fact that with the auxiliary items, the utility of a player uniquely identifies the player. Consequently, any two different vectors of utilities give two different sorted vectors. The sorted vector of a Lorenz dominating allocation is unique (by definition of the Lorenz domination partial order), and hence the (unsorted) vector is also unique.
Removing the auxiliary items from a Lorenz dominating allocation A ′ gives an allocation A that is Lorenz dominating with respect to the original MRF valuations f . For the sake of contradiction, suppose otherwise, that there is some allocation B such that A does not Lorenz dominate B. Then there is some k ≤ n such that the sum of the first k terms of the sorted vector of B is larger than the sum of the first k terms of the sorted vector of A. As the values of both sums are integer, the difference between the two sums is at least 1. Consequently, even A ′ does not Lorenz dominate B, because the total contribution of auxiliary items is at most n i=1 i n 2 < 1, contradicting the assumption that A ′ was Lorenz dominating with respect to f ′ .
The Prioritized Egalitarian (PE) Mechanism
We can now present our allocation mechanism for MRF valuations, that we refer to as the prioritized egalitarian (PE) mechanism. We assume for this purpose that each MRF f i has a succinct representation (of size polynomial in the number m of items) such that given this representation, for every S one may compute f i (S) (answer value queries) in time polynomial in m.
1. The mechanism imposes an arbitrary priority order σ among the agents. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the order is from 1 to n, where player 1 has highest priority.
2. Every player is requested to report his MRF to the mechanism. A report that is not an MRF (or failure to provide a report at all) is considered illegal, and is replaced by the MRF that is identically 0 (and consequently, the non-redundant allocation will not give such a player any item).
3. Given the reported MRF valuation functions r 1 , . . . , r n , the mechanism computes a nonredundant Lorenz dominating allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) with respect to these reports and σ (as implied by Theorem 7), and gives each player i the respective set A i .
We now show that the PE mechanism is truthful. For this we introduce some notation. Given a valuation function f i and a set D of items, we use f i|D to denote the function f i restricted to the items of D. Namely, for every set S, f i|D (S) = f i (S ∩ D). We note that if f i is an MRF, then so is f i|D . Truthfulness will be a consequence of the following properties of the allocation mechanism.
• We say that an allocation mechanism is faithful if the following holds for every collection f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of valuation functions and for every player i. Let A i denote the allocation of the mechanism to player i when the reported valuation functions are f . Then if instead player i reports valuation function f i|A i (and the reports of the other players remain unchanged), then the allocation to player i remains A i . We say that an allocation mechanism is strongly faithful if it is faithful, and in addition, for every set A ′ ⊂ A i , if player i reports valuation function f i|A ′ (and the reports of the other players remain unchanged), then the allocation to player i becomes A ′ .
• We say that an allocation mechanism is monotone if the following holds for every collection f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of valuation functions, every player i, and every two sets of items S and T with S ⊂ T . Let A i|S denote the allocation of the mechanism to player i when the reported valuation function for player i is f i|S and the remaining reports are as in f . Then if instead player i reports a legal (see remark that follows) valuation function f i|T (and the remaining reports remain unchanged), then the allocation A i|T to player i satisfies
It may happen that f i is not an MRF, f i|T is not an MRF, but f i|S happens to be an MRF. In this case the PE mechanism might produce a nonempty A i|S and an empty A i|T , violating the inequality f i (A i|T ) ≥ f i (A i|S ). For this reason we do not impose the monotonicity condition if the valuation function f i|T is illegal with respect to the underlying allocation mechanism.)
We next prove that the PE mechanism is truthful. Some of the claims used in the proof are presented and proved in the appendix.
Theorem 8
The PE mechanism is truthful for players with MRF valuations. Namely, for every player with an MRF valuation, reporting her true valuation function maximizes her utility, for any reports of the other players.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player v. Fix the reported valuation functions of all other players. All these reported valuation functions can be assumed to be MRFs, because the PE mechanism replaces every non-MRF reported function by the all 0 MRF. Let f v be the MRF valuation of v. Let A v denote the set of items that v receives when reporting f v . Suppose now that instead v reports a different valuation function f ′ v = f v , and receives an allocation
. We may assume that f ′ v is an MRF, as otherwise v gets no item and 
Finally, we prove that the PE mechanism can be computed efficiently.
Theorem 9 If the players have MRF valuations with succinct representations, then the PE mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time.
ǫ-Leveled Valuations
We have shown (Theorem 3) that for submodular dichotomous (MRF) valuations there is a deterministic truthful allocation mechanism that always outputs welfare maximizing allocations that is Lorentz dominating and thus satisfies multiple fairness properties. In this section we want to explore the robustness of this result, by examining the extent in which we can relax the assumption that the marginal value of any item with respect to any set is either exactly 0 or exactly 1. A natural relaxation of this assumption is to allow marginals to be almost those values. It turns out the result for MRF valuations is not sensitives to undesired items having negative utility instead of 0, so we focus on relaxing the assumption that positive marginals must be 1, and instead allow the positive marginals to be in [1, 1 + ǫ], allowing a player not to be indifferent between desired items. This is the case of ǫ-dichotomous valuations in which the marginal value of every item is either 0 or in [1, 1 + ǫ]. While our prioritized egalitarian mechanism presented in Section 3 for MRF valuations maximizes welfare, it is easy to see that once we allow desired items to have different values, no truthful allocation mechanism will be welfare maximizing. (If the mechanism always maximizes welfare, it is easy to construct examples where players have incentives to report a value of 1 + ǫ for items that they value at 1.) Nevertheless, as valuations are ǫ-dichotomous, reasonable allocations have maximal size and almost maximize welfare (getting at least 1 1+ǫ fraction), see Observation 24, so we aim for truthful mechanism that always outputs an allocation with welfare at least 1 1+ǫ fraction of the maximum welfare. We call such an allocation approximately welfare maximizing.
Unfortunately, for ǫ-dichotomous players, truthfulness and the requirement to output approximately welfare maximizing allocations are at odds, even when allowing randomized mechanisms. Indeed, the following example shows that for every ǫ > 0 there is no truthful mechanism (deterministic or randomized 5 ) that always returns an approximately welfare maximizing allocation for ǫ-dichotomous submodular valuations (that are unit demand, not additive).
Example 10 Let the set of items be M = {L, H}, and there are two players with ǫ-dichotomous valuations. Both players 1, 2 are unit demand with identical valuation function f satisfying f (L) = 1, f (H) = 1+ǫ (both players slightly prefer the high value item H over the low value item L). When both agents report their true valuation, at least one of them has positive probability of not getting item H. W.l.o.g., let player 1 be that player. If player 1 reports a valuation f 1 (L) = 0, f 1 (H) = 1 + ǫ (that is, that he does not want the low value item at all), and player 2 reports truthfully, the only approximately welfare maximizing allocation is the one in which agent 1 receives item H (and agent 2 gets L) and therefore agent 1 gets higher utility by lying.
Given Example 10 above it is clear we could not achieve the desired properties for ǫdichotomous valuations, so we consider the problem of designing a truthful and approximately welfare maximizing mechanism only for the more restricted class of ǫ-dichotomous additive valuations (ǫ-leveled valuations). A truthful mechanism that always outputs approximately welfare maximizing allocations for ǫ-leveled valuations indeed exists: order the players arbitrarily and allow each player in turn to pick all items he desires out of the remaining items. Yet, this mechanism is clearly very unfair, as if the first player desires all items, he will take all items and other players will get nothing. Thus, we ask whether there exists a deterministic truthful allocation mechanism for ǫ-leveled players that always outputs approximately welfare maximizing allocations and is fair. Unfortunately, we show that even with two players and three items, there does not exist such a deterministic mechanism that satisfies the following minimal fairness property: if a player desires two items, he gets at least one of them. This precludes a mechanism that satisfies any of our fairness properties (e.g., maximin fair, EF1).
Proposition 11
There is no deterministic truthful allocation mechanism for allocating three items to two ǫ-leveled players that always outputs approximately welfare maximizing allocations, and in case that a player desires two items, he gets at least one of them.
We remark that Amanatidis et al. [2] present impossibility results concerning fair allocation mechanisms for two players with additive valuations, but the setting of Proposition 11 is not captured by these results, as it restricts players to be ǫ-leveled, and not just additive.
Given this negative result for deterministic mechanisms, we will consider randomized mechanisms. We aim for a mechanism that is truthful in expectation (over the randomization of the mechanism), is approximately welfare maximizing, and is as fair as possible (ex-post, for any realization). Clearly such a mechanism that always outputs a Lorentz dominating allocation does not exist (as such an allocation might not exist 6 ), yet, maybe a Lorentz dominating allocation exists when rounding down the value of every set to the nearest integer (essentially only counting the number of desired items in the set)?
We first formalize the notation of rounding down a valuation function. Given a function f , we definef to be the floor of f as follows:
We observe that such a rounding does not change the value of any set by much:
Observation 12 For non-negative ǫ < 1 m , and any ǫ-dichotomous valuation f , the floor functionf is dichotomous and for every set S ⊆ M ,
Additionally, if f is ǫ-leveled then the functionf is dichotomous and additive.
As moving from ǫ-dichotomous valuations to their floors only results with very small changes to the valuations (up to a multiplicative term of (1 + ǫ), by Equation (2)), one may hope that mechanisms that achieve some fairness properties for dichotomous valuations, also have these properties holding approximately when they run on the floor valuations. As Lorentz dominating allocations have many desired fairness properties (recall Proposition 5) it would be most attractive to show that there exist randomized truthful in expectation allocation mechanism for ǫ-leveled players that for any valuations f always outputs a Lorentz dominating allocation with respect tof . Unfortunately, this is not achievable as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 13 Consider any of the following fairness properties: being Lorentz dominating, being min-square, maximizing NSW, being lex-min, being EFX. Every randomized truthful in expectation allocation mechanism for allocating two items to two ǫ-leveled players either sometimes fails to satisfy this property ex-post, even with respect tof , or sometimes fails to be reasonable (fails to allocate a demanded item to some player who demands it).
Given this negative result, the fairness properties that we can hope the mechanism could achieve are EF1 and maximin fairness. Moreover, as the mechanisms we consider are randomized, we can hope to also get proportionality in expectation (clearly it cannot be obtained ex-post). Recall that S gives player
/n for every player v, and a randomized mechanism is proportional in expectation if for every player, the expected value of the allocation to the player is at least f v (M )/n when truthful.
In light of the above, we aim to design a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation for ǫ-leveled valuations, always outputs approximately welfare maximizing allocations, is EF1 and maximin fair with respect to the floor valuationsf , and is proportional in expectation (for f ). Note that EF1 and maximin fair with respect to the floor valuationsf implies that the corresponding inequality holds, up to a small multiplicative loss, with respect to the actual valuations f (e.g., for maximin, the player is getting at least 1 1+ǫ -fraction of the maximin share). We emphasize that we are aiming for exact truthfulness and we are not satisfied with mechanisms for which truth telling is only approximately best 7 . We next present a mechanism that achieves all these properties.
The mechanism we design will work on the floor valuations, or equivalently, ask players for the set of items they desire (have value in [1, 1 + ǫ]), and not try to elicit the exact value of each item. This approached allows using mechanism designed for dichotomous valuations to work for ǫ-dichotomous valuations. Given a mechanism M for dichotomous valuations we denote byM the mechanism for ǫ-dichotomous valuations such thatM(f ) = M(f ) for ǫ < 1 m . It is easy to see that if M gives each truthful player with dichotomous valuations his maximin share, thenM gives each truthful player with ǫ-dichotomous valuation at least 1 1+ǫ -fraction of his maximin share (and similarly, the inequalities defining EF1 and EFX approximately hold, see Observation 23).
A Truthful Mechanism for Leveled Valuations
In this section, we present a truthful 8 in expectation allocation mechanism for ǫ-leveled valuations (for small enough ǫ > 0). Recall that an ǫ-leveled valuation is an additive valuation in which the marginal value of every item is either in [1, 1 + ǫ], or is zero 9 . We prove that when agents are truthful, the allocation is reasonable (and thus approximately welfare maximizing) and satisfies several notions of fairness. It is 1 1+ǫ -maximin fair and 1 1+ǫ -EF1 (both are ex-post notions, giving a fairness guarantee for every realization of the randomness of the mechanism). Also, every player gets his proportional share in expectation.
The problem in using the prioritized egalitarian mechanism when players have ǫ-leveled valuations is that it is no longer truthful (as implied by Proposition 11). Yet, the mechanism is ǫ-truthful, meaning that a truthful player loses only a small fraction of his value due to being truthful. We suggest a (rather general) randomized method, based on combining an almost-truthful reasonable mechanism with another simple deterministic mechanism that allocates either one or two random items to players with random priorities, and using the original mechanism only on the remaining items, to obtain a truthful in expectation mechanism. Crucially, the second mechanism will create a strict incentive (that is large enough) to be truthful, to overcome the loss of a truthful player in the prioritized egalitarian mechanism.
More specifically, we pick one or two random items to leave out and run the prioritized egalitarian mechanism with random priorities over players. We then run the additional mechanism with reverse priority order, on the set of items left aside, only allocating items to players demanding them, and not allocating the second item to the player that got the first, if possible. The fact that we only allocate to players demanded items creates an incentive to not hide demanded items, while the possibility of getting the first item in the expense of the second, creates incentive not to add undesired items. We show that when ǫ is small enough, the combined mechanism will be truthful in expectation. Additionally, it will satisfy several important fairness properties (the reversal of the priority order in the second mechanism is crucial for that). With this high-level description in mind, we move to formally describe the mechanism.
We first introduce a deterministic truthful and reasonable allocation mechanism M X that given a list of items X (consisting of 1 or 2 items), priority order σ over the players, and a reported demanded set R v for every player v, returns an allocation A X as follows:
1. If there is player v with X[1] ∈ R v , then allocate X[1] to the highest priority player v such that X[1] ∈ R v , and move v to have the lowest priority.
2. If |X| > 1 and X[2] ∈ R v for some v, then allocate X[2] to highest priority player v such that X[2] ∈ R v .
Proposition 14 For players that have additive dichotomous valuations, M X is reasonable, truthful, EF1, and moreover, a player never envies a player that has lower priority than him.
We now present a truthful in expectation randomized allocation mechanism M L for settings where all players valuations are ǫ-leveled for ǫ < 1 nm 3 . Let M B be the prioritized egalitarian (PE) mechanism described in Section 3 for MRF valuations (we will use it for the special case of additive dichotomous valuations.) Let M L be the following mechanism:
1. Each agent v is asked to report a set R v , of the items he demands.
2. Pick an item x uniformly at random from M , and let X[1] = x.
With probability 1 − 1
m pick an item y = x uniformly at random and set X[2] = y. 4. Let σ be a random order of priorities over the players.
Let
A B be the allocation of M B and players ordered by σ, and the reported sets R v \ X for each player v. 10 6. Let A X be the allocation of M X with the set of items X and players ordered by reverse(σ), and the reported sets R v ∩ X for each player v.
Return
We use the properties of M B and of M X to prove that mechanism M L satisfies multiple desired properties (for the proof see Appendix C.3).
Theorem 15 When all players are ǫ-leveled for ǫ < 1 nm 3 mechanism M L has the following properties:
1. M L is a truthful in expectation mechanism. I.e., each player maximizes his expected value (over the randomization of the mechanism) by reporting the set of items he demands truthfully, for any reports of the others. 11 Additionally, the mechanism is ex-post ǫ-truthful.
2. M L is reasonable. Thus the welfare ex-post is at least 1 1+ǫ -fraction of the maximum welfare, when players are truthful.
M L guarantees every truthful agent his 1
1+ǫ -maximin share. Additionally, M L is 1 1+ǫ -EF1 for truthful agents. 4 . Each truthful player receives his proportional share in expectation. 12 
M L can be implemented in polynomial time in the number of items and agents.

A Approximate truthfulness and approximate fairness notions
Each of the notions of maximin share, EF, EF1 and EFX can be relaxed to hold only up to an multiplicative term of α. We next formally defined those notions.
For a given valuations functions f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) and α ∈ [0, 1]:
is at least α fraction of his maximin share for every player v ∈ V . We use α-maximin(f v ) to denote this share.
• A mechanism M is ǫ-truthful if for every player v with valuation f v and any reports of the other players f −v , and any report f ′ v of v, it holds that
I.e., player v can only increase his value by at most a multiplicative factor of 1 + ǫ by being non-truthful.
B Missing proofs for MRF Valuations B.1 Fairness Properties of Lorenz Dominating Allocations
We next restate and prove Proposition 5. Proof. Let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) denote the valuation functions of the players, and suppose that A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is a Lorenz dominating allocation.
1. Let A ′ be an allocation that maximizes welfare. Then for the sorted utility vectors,
Consequently, A maximizes welfare.
Allocation A is also a lexmin allocation, because for every allocation
A ′ , the inequality s A,f ≥ lexmin s A ′ ,f is implied by s A,f ≥ Lorenz s A ′ ,f .
Allocation
A can be shown to maximize NSW by considering the entries of s A,f in a forward order, and using concavity of the product function i x i (for non-negative variables).
A maximizes welfare (as required by min-square allocations), and can be shown to be min-square by considering the entries of s A,f in a backward order, and using convexity of the min-square function i (x i ) 2 .
Suppose now that the valuations are MRFs and that the Lorenz dominating allocation is non-redundant. In this case, we prove that the allocation is EFX. Let i, j ∈ [n] be such that i envies j, that is f i (A j ) > f i (A i ). By the non-redundancy property we have that f i (A i ) = |A i |. If |A j | ≤ |A i | + 1, then the EFX condition holds. Hence suppose for the sake of contradiction that |A j | ≥ |A i | + 2. By the non-redundancy property we have that f j (A j ) = |A j | ≥ f i (A i ) + 2. By the matroid exchange property of MRFs it follows that there is an item e ∈ A j such that
. Moving item e from player j to player i gives an allocation that Lorenz dominates A, thus contradicting the assumption that |A j | ≥ |A i | + 2.
Finally, suppose that the valuations are additive dichotomous. In this case, we prove that any Lorenz dominating allocation A is maximin fair. Let D v be the set of demand items for player v. The maximin share of v is t = |Dv| n . Assume for the sake of contradiction that v receives at most t − 1 items from D v . As A is welfare maximizing, all of D v is allocated, and items in D v are only allocated to players that demand these items. Hence some other player, say u, receives at least t + 1 items from D v , and has utility at least t + 1. Moving one such item from u to v results in an allocation that Lorenz dominates A. As no allocation can Lorenz dominate the Lorenz dominating allocation A, it must be that v receives at least his maximin share.
We next restate and prove Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 There are MRF valuation functions with respect to which no Lorenz dominating allocation is maximin fair. For every collection of MRF valuation functions, in every Lorenz dominating allocation every player gets at least half her maximin share.
Proof. Consider a set M of m = (2n − 1)n items that is partitioned into two sets: a set G with (n−1)n items and a set B with n 2 items. Define the MRF f 1 as f 1 (S) = |S ∩G|+min[|S ∩B|, n]. For 2 ≤ j ≤ n, define the MRF f j as f j (S) = |S ∩ G|. The maximin share of player 1 is 2n − 1 (partition M into n bundles, each containing n−1 items from G and n items from B). However, every Lorenz dominating allocation gives each player n items (player 1 gets n items from B, and the other players each get n items from G). Hence Lorenz domination does not imply maximin fairness. Now let f = {f 1 , . . . , f n } be a collection of arbitrary MRF valuation functions and let A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } be an arbitrary Lorenz dominating allocation. Suppose that the maximin share of player 1 is t. This means that there is a partition of the items into n bundles (S 1 , . . . , S n ), with f 1 (S j ) ≥ t for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Denote f 1 (A 1 ) by t ′ , and suppose for the sake of contradiction that t ′ < t 2 . Then the matroid exchange property implies that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the set S j contains at least t − t ′ ≥ t ′ + 1 distinct items such that each one of them has marginal value 1 to f 1 with respect to A 1 . Call these items valuable and note that the total number of valuable items is at least n(t ′ +1). No player i = 1 can hold more than t ′ +1 valuable items, as the Lorenz dominating allocation would transfer such an item from player i to player 1. Hence there are at most (n − 1)(t ′ + 1) valuable items allocated to other players, which implies that some valuable item remains unallocated. This contradicts the assumption that A is Lorenz dominating.
B.2 Missing proofs from Section 3.1
In the proof of Theorem 7 we made use of Lemma 18. Before proving that Lemma, we introduce a key lemma that will serve us in several of our proofs. The lemma basically shows that we can move from one allocation closer (with respect to utilities) to the other, by "moving an item" from a player that got too much, to one that got too little. The item that one player lost might not be the same as the item another player gains, and in the process we might need to exchange some items between the players.
Lemma 16 Let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be MRF valuations, and let A = (A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n ) and B = (B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B n ) be two non-redundant allocations, where A 0 and B 0 specify the sets of items that remain unallocated. Let S + ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n} be the set of those indices j for which |A j | > |B j |, let S − be the set of indices j for which |A j | < |B j |, and let S = be the set of indices j for which |A j | = |B j |. Suppose that S − \ {0} is not empty (consequently also S + is not empty), and let i be a player with i ∈ S − . Then there is a non-redundant allocation C = (C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n ) with the following properties:
There is precisely one index
3. For every j ∈ {i, k} it holds that |C j | = |A j |.
4.
For every j ∈ S + it holds that C j ⊆ A j (with set equality unless j = k).
Before proving the lemma, let us provide some intuition. Consider three players p 1 , p 2 , p 3 and two items e 1 , e 2 , where players have additive dichotomous valuations, p 1 desires only e 1 , and p 2 and p 3 both desire both items. We consider allocations that leave no item unallocated. Let We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 16. Proof.(Lemma 16) For an item e, let A(e) denote the player that e is allocated to under A (and 0 if e is not allocated), and let B(e) denote the player that e is allocated to under B.
Consider the following labeled directed (multi-) graph G A→B (it may have parallel edges) with nodes v 0 , v 1 , . . . v n . For every item e, if B(e) = A(e) then place a directed edge (v A(e) , v B(e) ) and label it by e. Nodes in S − have higher in-degree than out-degree, nodes in S = have the same in-degree as out-degree, and nodes in S + have higher out-degree than in-degree. A directed (not necessarily simple) path in the graph will simply be referred to as a path. A path will be called legal if starting at allocation A and transfer those items that label the edges of the path (each such item is transfered from the player who holds it under A to the player who holds it under B) results in a non-redundant allocation. Recall that i ∈ S − and that S + is nonempty. A legal path will be called useful if it starts at S + (let v k denote its starting vertex), then never visits S + again, and ends at v i . A useful path must exist, by the following inductive argument that constructs a useful path by starting at the end of the useful path (at an edge entering v i ) and working backwards towards the beginning of the path (to an edge leaving v k ).
Start at v i . As v i ∈ S − , we have that |B i | > |A i |. The matroid exchange property implies that there must be at least |B i | − |A i | different items such that if we transfer any of them from the player holding it under A to player i, the allocation remains non-redundant. Choose one such item e. (Remark. For the purpose of proving the lemma, e can be chosen arbitrarily. However, when we use this Lemma in the proof of Lemma 21, we shall choose the item e in a more careful way.) Item e necessarily labels an incoming edge into v i , say from vertex v j . Transfer e from v j to v i (and include the edge labeled by e in the useful path). This changes A into a new allocation A ′ . Now consider v j . If v j ∈ S + we are done. Hence it remains to address the case that v j ∈ S + . For this we consider the labeled directed graph G A ′ →B , which is obtained from G A→B by removing the edge labeled by e. Analogously to the definition with respect to A, we now have new setsŜ + ,Ŝ − ,Ŝ = with respect to A ′ . Observe that v j ∈Ŝ − (because v j ∈ S = ∪ S − and it lost an item), that v i ∈Ŝ = ∪Ŝ − (because v i ∈ S − and it gained an item), and all other players remain in their original sets (in particular,Ŝ + = S + ). Hence now the argument can be repeated from v j ∈Ŝ − . Eventually, we must reach a vertex in S + , as the number of edges decreases in each iteration, and there always is at least one edge incident with S + .
Doing all the transfers implied by the edges of the useful path gives the desired allocation C.
Given MRF valuation functions, consider the following greedy algorithm for generating an allocation. Fix an arbitrary priority order among players, say from 1 to n, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let S i denote the set of the first i players. Each player in his turn is allocated the largest possible number n i of items subject to the constraint that there is a non-redundant allocation A i = (A i 1 , . . . , A i i ) such that |A i j | = n j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ i. That is, player i gets the maximum possible number of (non-redundant) items, subject to preserving the utilities of all players that precede i.
Lemma 17
If players have MRF valuations, then for every i ∈ [n], the above greedy algorithm gives an allocation that attains W (S i ) (maximizes welfare for the set of first i players in the priority order).
Proof. Given the priority order over players, let B be an allocation produced by the greedy algorithm. Among all allocations that maximize welfare, let A be an allocation whose utility vector (sorted according to the priority order) is lexicographically largest. We claim that A and B have the same utility vector. For the sake of contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then by the greedy choice of B, there must be an index ℓ such that for all i < ℓ we have |A i | = |B i |, and |A ℓ | < |B ℓ |. Apply Lemma 16 with i = ℓ. This causes |A ℓ | to increase by one, and the player k who loses an item must have index larger than ℓ (as {1, . . . , k − 1} ∈ S = ). This contradicts the choice of A as lexicographically largest.
We can now prove Lemma 18 that was used in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 18
For the valuation function f ′ = (f ′ 1 , . . . , f ′ n ) defined above (MRFs augmented with the auxiliary items), the respective welfare function W (defined in the proof of Theorem 7) is submodular.
Proof. Let V denote the set of players. To show that W is submodular, we need to show that for every set S ⊂ V and every two players u, v ⊂ V \ S it holds that W (S ∪ {u}) + W (S ∪ {v}) ≥ W (S) + W (S ∪ {u, v}). For the purpose of proving this inequality, we may ignore the auxiliary items, as their contribution to the utility is additive, and hence they contribute equally to both sides of the inequality.
Fix a priority order over S ∪ {u, v} such that players in S appear first, then u followed by v. Apply the greedy algorithm on this order to find an allocation A = (A S , A u , A v ) that attains W (S ∪ {u, v}). By Lemma 17, the allocation A S attains W (S). As (A S , A u ) is a non-redundant allocation for S ∪ {u} and (A S , A v ) is a non-redundant allocation for S ∪ {v} we get:
proving the corollary.
B.3 Missing proofs from Section 3.2
Proposition 19
The PE mechanism is faithful.
Proof. Let A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) be a non-redundant Lorenz dominating allocation under f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ). Replacing f i by f i|A i does not enlarge the set of non-redundant allocation, and so A remains Lorenz dominating. By Theorem 7, all Lorenz dominating allocations have the same value vector, and hence player i must receive A i in the new non-redundant Lorenz dominating allocation.
Lemma 20
The PE mechanism is monotone.
Proof. Fix the valuation functions f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), a player p, and two sets of items S and T with S ⊂ T . Every player j = p reports f j . Let A be the allocation output by the PE mechanism when player p reports f p|S , and let B be the allocation when player p reports f p|T . To prove monotonicity in general, we may assume that |T | = |S| + 1 (and use induction if |T | > |S| + 1). Hence T differs from S by one item, and let us call this item a. We need to show that f p|T (B p ) ≥ f p|T (A p ). Given that the allocations produced by PE are non-redundant, this translates to proving that |B p | ≥ |A p |. Assume for the sake of contradiction that |B p | < |A p |. In this case, necessarily a ∈ B p (because otherwise B could be output by PE instead of A when player p reported f p|S , and as A and B have different utility vectors, at least one of them is not Lorenz dominating).
Let S + be the set of those indices j for which |A j | > |B j |, let S − be the set of indices j for which |A j | < |B j |, and let S = be the set of indices j for which |A j | = |B j |. Observe that p ∈ S + and hence S + is non-empty. As B allocates at least as many items as A (since it is welfare maximizing), then S − is non-empty as well. Among all players in S + , let q denote the unique player that minimizes |B q |, breaking ties in favour of higher priority players. Likewise, among all players in S − , let r denote the unique player that minimizes |A r |, breaking ties in favour of higher priority players. Now there are two cases to consider, and each of them leads to a contradiction.
• Either |A r | < |B q |, or |A r | = |B q | and r has higher priority than q. In this case, Lemma 16 (with i = r) implies that we can transform A into an allocation in which r gains an item, and a player k in S + loses an item. Note that even after losing an item, k has at least |B k | items, implying (together with the condition defining the case) that the new allocation Lorenz dominates A (with respect to the priority order of the PE mechanism). This contradicts the assumption that A was chosen by the PE mechanism.
• Either |A r | > |B q |, or |A r | = |B q | and r has lower priority than q. In this case switch the roles of A and B (and of S + and S − ) and apply Lemma 16 with i = q. The lemma transforms B into an allocation in which q gains an item, and some player k (in the original S − ) loses an item, and this new allocation Lorenz-dominates B.
Lemma 21
The PE mechanism is strongly faithful.
Proof. As the number of items allocated under B is at most one more than under A (and recall that |A v | ≤ |B v | − 2), S + includes at least one player. Now we complete the proof via an argument copied almost verbatim from the proof of Lemma 20, except for a small change in the first of the two cases below.
Among all players in S + , let q denote the unique player that minimizes |B q |, breaking ties in favour of higher priority players. Likewise, among all players in S − , let r denote the unique player that minimizes |A r |, breaking ties in favour of higher priority players. Now there are two cases to consider, and each of them leads to a contradiction.
• Either |A r | < |B q |, or |A r | = |B q | and r has higher priority than q. In this case, Lemma 16 (with i = r) implies that we can transform A into an allocation in which r gains an item, and a player k in S + loses an item. Importantly (see the remark in the proof of Lemma 16), we can do so without transferring item e to player v (recall that in the setting of A, player v does not desire item e), because |B v | ≥ |A v | + 2. Note that even after losing an item, k has at least |B k | items, implying (together with the condition defining the case) that the new allocation Lorenz dominates A (with respect to the priority order of the PE mechanism). This contradicts the assumption that A was chosen by the PE mechanism.
Remark 22
The combination of strong faithfulness and monotonicity implies a Lipschitz property for PE. That is, if agent i changes its report from f i|S to f i|(S∪{a}) (for an MRF f i , a set S, and an item a ∈ S), then the number of items allocated to i increases by at most 1 (and does not decrease, by monotonicity). To see this, suppose that for f i|S the allocation to player i is A i , for f i| ( 
B.4 Polynomial Time Algorithm for the PE Mechanism
We next restate and prove Theorem 9.
Proof. Given a priority order σ (w.l.o.g., from 1 to n) over the players and MRF valuation functions f 1 , . . . , f n , we reduce the problem of finding a Lorenz dominating allocation (with respect to σ) to a polynomial sequence of matroid intersection problems. The matroid intersection problem has a set S of mn items, arranged in n groups, S 1 , . . . S n , each with m items. For every item e ∈ M , make n copies e 1 , . . . , e n of the item, placing e i in S i for every i. We now define two matroids over S. A set T is independent in matroid M 1 if and only if for every i ∈ [n] the set T ∩ S i is independent with respect to the MRF f i . A set is independent in matroid M 2 if for each of the original items e ∈ M , the set T contains at most one of its copies. There is a natural bijection between the set of non-redundant allocations and the independent sets of M 1 ∩ M 2 . In this bijection, an allocation A is mapped to the set T that is independent in M 1 ∩ M 2 , where e j ∈ T iff item e is allocated to player j under A. Hence allocations that maximize welfare correspond to independent sets of maximum rank. These can be found by a matroid intersection algorithm [22] . Matroid intersection algorithms can be run in polynomial time if one is given oracle access to independence queries for each of the two matroids M 1 and M 2 . Having a succinct representation for the MRFs (that allows answering value queries) suffices for this purpose.
Let A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) be an allocation that maximizes welfare, found by the matroid intersection algorithm. As A need not be Lorenz dominating, we are not done yet. To proceed, we use the correspondence between Lorenz dominating allocations and min-square allocations (see Proposition 5) . Specifically, given the priority order, it can be seen that the Lorenz dominating allocation is the one that minimizes the potential i∈[n] (|A i | + i n ) 2 . We now present a polynomial time algorithm that tests whether A is an allocation of smallest potential (among allocations that maximize welfare), and if the outcome is negative, it returns a maximum welfare allocation C with smaller potential. We shall use Lemma 16. Suppose that A does not minimize potential, and let B denote an arbitrary Lorenz dominating allocation (and hence it has smallest potential). Let i ∈ S − be the player with smallest |A i | (breaking ties in favour of players of higher priority). Let j ∈ S + be the player with smallest |B i | (breaking ties in favour of players of higher priority). Necessarily |A i | ≤ |B j |, with equality only if i has higher priority than j, as otherwise B cannot be Lorenz dominating. Applying Lemma 16, there is an allocation C whose vector of utilities differs from that of A in two entries: i gains one item, and a player k ∈ S + loses one item. Necessarily, C has smaller potential than A. To find such an allocation C (note that neither B nor the sets S − and S + are known to the algorithm), try all O(n 2 ) choices for (i, k) that make sense (e.g., no need to consider pairs for which |A i | > |A k |). The feasibility of each such choice can be checked as follows. Observe that for every nonnegative integer t and every MRF f i the function f i|≤t defined as f i|≤t (T ) = min[t, f i (T )] (for every set T ⊂ M ), is still an MRF. Solve the matroid intersection problem with the following modified MRF valuation functions f 1|≤t 1 , . . . , f n|≤tn , where t i = |A i | + 1, t k = |A k | − 1, and t j = |A j | for every j ∈ [n] \ {i, k}.
After at most O(m 2 n 2 ) iterations an allocation of smallest potential is found. This is because the potential is a multiple of 1 n 2 , and the highest possible potential is at most (m + 1) 2 .
Proof. Let M = {a, b, c}, and V = {u, v}. We denote an ǫ-leveled valuation function f over M as the vector r f = (f (a), f (b), f (c)). Given a vector r of size 3, we denote by f r the additive function such that for every S, f r ({a}) = r 1 , f r ({b}) = r 2 , f r ({c}) = r 3 . For an allocation A and a player w ∈ V , A w is the set of items allocated to player w Let M be a deterministic truthful mechanism that approximates the social welfare for ǫleveled players. We look at the three allocations A 1 = M((1 + ǫ, 0, 0), (1 + ǫ, 0, 0)), A 2 = M((0, 1 + ǫ, 0), (0, 1 + ǫ, 0)), A 3 = M((0, 0, 1 + ǫ), (0, 0, 1 + ǫ)). By that M is almost welfare maximizer, it must be that a (resp. b, c) is allocated in A 1 (resp. A 2 , A 3 ). Thus, there exists a player that in at least two of these three allocations, was allocated the item he desires. We assume w.l.o.g. that player u is that player and a ∈ A 1 u and b ∈ A 2 u . Let A 4 = M ((1 + ǫ, 1, 0) , (1 + ǫ, 0, 0)). By that M is almost welfare maximizer, we get that A 4 u must contain b, and by truthfulness of player u we get that
where the first equality is since a ∈ A 1 u . Thus, A 4 u must also contain item a, so A 4 u contains both items, a and b. By symmetry, for A 5 = M((1, 1 + ǫ, 0), (0, 1 + ǫ, 0)), we get that a, b ∈ A 5 u . Let A 6 = M((1 + ǫ, 1, 0), (0, 1 + ǫ, 0)). By truthfulness for player u, we get that
, therefore, both a and b must be in A 6 u . Let A 7 = M((1 + ǫ, 1, 0), (1, 1 + ǫ, 0)). By truthfulness for player v it must be that 0
Thus, allocation A 7 does not satisfy the fairness property for player v.
We next restate and prove Proposition 13.
Proof. Let the set of items be M = {L, H}, and consider two players with the same ǫ-leveled valuation function f , satisfying f (L) = 1 and f (H) = 1 + ǫ. When both players report their true valuation, any Lorentz dominating allocation (and likewise for lex-min, NSW, min square, and likewise for a reasonable allocation that is EFX) gives each player one item. Thus, in that case at least one player has positive probability of getting item L. W.l.o.g., let player 1 be that player. If player 1 reports a valuation f 1 (L) = 0, f 1 (H) = 1 + ǫ and player 2 reports truthfully, the only Lorentz dominating allocation (and likewise for the other fairness properties considered here) is that player 1 receives item H (and player 2 receives L). Therefore player 1 gains higher utility by not reporting her true valuation function.
C.3 Proof of the Main Theorem for ǫ-leveled Valuations
In this section we restate and prove Theorem 15. We first prove a useful claim about M X :
Proof. M X is reasonable since every item in X will be allocated if and only if it is in R v for some player v, and only to a player that demands it. M X is truthful for additive dichotomous players since if a player receives the whole set X by being truthful, he cannot gain by misreporting. Else, by manipulating, the player can either add an unwanted item, or trade a wanted item by another which does not increase his value since his valuation is dichotomous.
M X is EF1 since the only case where a player receives two items, is if he is the only one that demanded item X [2] . For two players u and v such that u has higher priority than v, u does not envy v at all since the only way for v to get an item that u desires, is if u got another item.
We next restate and prove Theorem 15,  showing that mechanism M L satisfies multiple desired properties.
Else; there exist an agent i and an item j such that j ∈ R i ∩ D v . By Observation 23 we know that M B is ǫ-truthful, implying that a player loss from being truthful is small. We show that by reporting truthfully, the allocation A X v is significantly preferred overÃ X v in expectation (enough to overcome the loss in M B .) Combining these two observations yields the truthfulness of M L . To prove the claim about M X we first show that:
Lemma 26 For every player v, if there is an item j and a player i such that j ∈ R i ∩ D v , then:
Proof. We prove this inequality by considering two cases of R v . Case 1 [Hiding desired items]: There exists ℓ ∈ D v \ R v (i.e., v misreported and did not report item ℓ that he actually demands). Let e 1 be the event that X = (ℓ), and v is the highest priority player according to σ (in M X ), and letē 1 be the complement event. Then:
where the second inequality holds since in event e 1 ,f v (A X v ) = 1 andf v (Ã X v ) = 0, and that M X is truthful. Additionally, the third inequality uses the fact that Pr[e 1 ] = 1 nm 2 (v has highest priority with probability 1/n, independently, |X| = 1 with probability 1/m, conditional on |X| = 1, l is the item in X with probability 1/m).
Case 2 [Reporting undesired items as desired]: There exists ℓ ∈ R v \ D v (i.e., v added undemanded item ℓ to his report). Let e 2 be the event that X = (ℓ, j) (recall that j ∈ R i ∩ D v ), and v has the highest priority in mechanism M X . Then:
where the second inequality holds since in event e 2 ,f v (A X v ) = 1 andf v (Ã X v ) = 0, and that M X is truthful. Additionally, the third inequality uses the fact that Pr[e 2 ] = 1 nm 2 (v has highest priority with probability 1/n, independently, |X| = 2 with probability (m − 1)/m, and X = (l, j), conditional on |X| = 2, with probability 1/(m(m − 1))).
With Lemma 26 we now prove that M L is truthful in expectation. It holds that:
where the first inequality is since that M B is ǫ-truthful by Observation 23, and the second inequality is since E[f v (Ã v )] ≤ (1 + ǫ)m and ǫ < 1 nm 3 . We now prove that M L is ex-post ǫ-truthful. Since both M B and M X are (ex-post) truthful for additive dichotomous players, it follows immediately that M L is (ex-post) truthful for additive dichotomous players. Combining with Observation 23 we get that M L is ex-post ǫ-truthful.
Lemma 27 M L is reasonable. Thus the welfare ex-post is at least 1 1+ǫ -fraction of the maximum welfare, when players are truthful.
Proof. M L is reasonable since both M B , M X are reasonable and since the players are additive. If A 1 (resp. A 2 ) is a reasonable allocation for the set of items M 1 (resp. M 2 ), then A 1 ∪ A 2 is reasonable for the set of items
The guarantee of the social welfare follows by Observation 24.
Lemma 28 M L guarantees every truthful agent his 1 1+ǫ -maximin share. Additionally, M L is 1 1+ǫ -EF1 for truthful agents.
Proof. Assume that player v is truthful, that is R v = D v . By Observation 23 it is enough to show that M L is maximin fair and EF1 for additive dichotomous valuations. Let i be the priority of player v in M B . Under the reports of R, we denote by A (resp. A B , A X ) the allocation M L (resp. M B , M X ). Note that if i = n and |R v ∩ X| ≥ 1 or i = n − 1 and |R v ∩ X| ≥ 2 then A X v = ∅, therefore:
We next present some properties of M B that we use in the proof that M L is EF1 and maximin fair.
Observation 29
In M B , a player with MRF valuation does not envy players with lower priority.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that a player v envies a lower priority player u. Since
By the exchange property of matroids, there exists an item in A B u ∩ R v , such that transferring this item from u to v, will be a non-redundant allocation in which v gets higher value, and therefore will Lorenzdominates A B which contradicts that M B returns a Lorenz-dominating allocation with respect to the priority order.
We now give a tighter bound of the number of items allocated by M B to a player depending on his priority.
Claim 30
For players that report additive dichotomous valuations, for every i ∈ [n], mechanism M B allocates at least |Rv\X|−i+1 n items to the player v that has priority i.
Proof. Fixing the set X, let n v be the number of items allocated by M B to player v. Since M B is EF1, for every player u with higher priority than v (there are i − 1 such players), the number of items allocated to u among R v \ X is at most n v + 1. By Observation 29, in M B player v does not envy player with lower priority than v (there are n − i such players), the number of items allocated to u among R v \ X is at most n v . Since M B is welfare maximizer, it must be that all items in R v are allocated, thus (i − 1) · (n v + 1) + n v + (n − i) · n v ≥ |R v \ X|, which implies the claim.
With Observation 29 and Claim 30 we can prove that M L is maximin fair and EF1 for additive dichotomous players.
We first prove that M L is maximin fair for additive dichotomous valuations. Consider a player v. It holds that
It holds that:
= maximin(f ),
where the first inequality is by Inequality (6) and Claim 30, and the last inequality is by the fact that ⌈ a n ⌉ + ⌊ b n ⌋ ≥ ⌊ a+b n ⌋ for every integers a, b. Now we prove that M L is EF1 for additive dichotomous players. We have that M B is EF1 for additive dichotomous players, furthermore, by Observation 29 in the allocation A B , players with higher priority do not envy players with lower priority (priorities in M B ). Let, u, v be any two players. If u has higher priority than player v (in M B ), thenf u (A B u ) ≥f u (A B v ), and if u has lower priority than player v (in M B ) thenf u (A B u ) ≥f u (A B v ) − 1. By Claim 14, we have that M X is EF1, and players with higher priority (in M X ) do not envy players with lower priority. I.e., if u has higher priority than player v (in M X ), thenf u (A X u ) ≥f u (A X v ), and if u has lower priority than v (in M X ) thenf u (A X u ) ≥f u (A X v ) − 1. We are now ready to prove that player u does not envy player v up to one item (i.e.,f u (A u ) ≥f u (A v ) − 1).
Since the priorities in M B and M X are reversed, we get that Case 1: If u has higher priority than v in M B (and lower priority in M X ) then
Case 2: If u has lower priority than v in M B (and higher priority in M X ) then
This completes the proof.
Lemma 31 Each truthful player receives his proportional share in expectation. 15 Proof. Suppose that player v is truthful, that is R v = D v . We show that v receives his proportional share in expectation. For agent v and profile of reports R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ), if for all i it holds that R i = R v then the allocation will always be the same partition, allocated according to the permutation over priorities. Thus, agent v will get each set of the partition with probability 1 n which yields an expected value of fv(Rv ) n .
Else, there exists i = v such that R i = R v . It holds that:
Under the reports of R, we denote by A (resp. A B , A X ) the allocation of M L (resp. M B , M X ).
For every given list S of size in {1, 2}, by Claim 30, given that X = S, if player v has priority i then |A B v | ≥ |Rv\S|−i+1 n . Thus, when considering the expectation over the priorities of v for a fixed S:
where the first equality is since for every x = an + b (for 0 ≤ b < n), the number of terms in {⌈ x−i n ⌉} 0≤i<n that equals a + 1 (resp. a) is b (resp. n − b). When taking expectation also over X, we get that:
where for the last equality we used E[|X|] = 1 m + 2(1 − 1 m ) = 2 − 1 m . Equation (11) basically states that the expected number of items that M B allocates to v is at least |R v | times the expected fraction of items that are not in X, divided by n.
Lemma 32
For every player v, if there exists a player i such that R v = R i then
Proof. Let α def = |X|. By considering the two possible values of α we observe that:
Similarly to Equation (11) for a fixed α ′ ∈ {1, 2} we have that
where Equation (14) is by conditioning on the size of R v ∩ X. If |R v ∩ X| = 1 and if v is the highest priority player in M X then he gets it. If |R v ∩ X| = 2 and v among the two highest original priority players in M X then he gets at least one item. We consider two cases of R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ): Case 1: There exist a player i and item j such that j ∈ R v \ R i . In this case if X = (j) then the probability over the priorities that player v will get item j is at least 1 n−1 , thus:
since for every a ∈ R v \ {j} if X = (a) then a is allocated to v with probability of at least 1 n while if X = (j), j is allocated to v with probability at least 1 n−1 . By combining Equations (13) , (14) , (15) , we get that:
Case 2: There exist a player i and an item j such that j ∈ R i \ R v . In this case if X = (j, ℓ) for ℓ ∈ R v , then the probability over the priorities that player v will get ℓ is at least 1 n−1 , thus:
where the inequality holds since if X = (j, ℓ) then the expected number of items player v gets is at least 1 n−1 . If X = (j, ℓ) then the expected number of items player v gets is at least |Rv∩X| n . By combining Equations (13), (14) , (16) , we get that:
With Lemma 32, we have
≥
which is the proportional share of player v.
Lemma 33 M L can be implemented in polynomial time in the number of items and agents.
Proof. Agents are asked to report to M L only their demand sets. Consequently, the computational complexity of M L does not depend of the number of bits needed to represent the valuations, and only depends on the number of agents and items. Both M B and M X can be implemented in time polynomial in the number of items and agents. Other steps of M L include selecting a random permutation over the players, and selecting at random one or two items to be included in X, and these steps can also be implemented efficiently (given a source of randomness). It follows that M L can be implemented in polynomial time.
D XOS valuations
We next consider dichotomous valuations beyond the submodular case. A class of valuations that contains submodular valuations is the class of XOS valuations. An XOS valuation f is defined by a set of additive valuations {f 1 , . . . , f k } and for every S, f (S) = max i∈[k] f i (S). An XOS dichotomous valuation, is a function that is both XOS and dichotomous. In the next claim, we use the following construction of an XOS dichotomous valuation. Given a family F of sets of items, we define f F (S) = max T ∈F |T ∩ S|. Clearly f F is XOS and dichotomous, since we can define for every T ∈ F , the additive function f T (S) = |T ∩ S|, and f F is the max over the {f T } T ∈F . We use such valuations to show that it is not possible to extend the result we have for submodular dichotomous players to XOS dichotomous players, even if there are only two players and only four items. We show that truthfulness and welfare maximization are at odds, even if one disregards all fairness considerations. This holds not only for deterministic truthful mechanisms, but even for randomized mechanisms that are only required to be truthful in expectation, as long as the mechanism must still maximize welfare ex-post.
Proposition 34 For the setting with two dichotomous XOS players and four items, there is no randomized truthful in expectation mechanism that always maximizes welfare.
Proof. Let the set of items M = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Given a family F of feasible subsets of M , let f F be the XOS dichotomous function f F (S) = max T ∈F
|T ∩ S|
Consider any mechanism that always picks an allocation that maximizes the welfare. If both players have the same family F 1 with only one feasible set T = {2, 3, 4}, then there is a player that gets more than one item in expectation, as welfare maximization implies that all three items in {2, 3, 4} must be allocated. W.l.o.g., we assume that player 1 is that player. Suppose now that player 1 has the family F 2 , that contains T and the set {1}, then if player 1 reports F 2 (and player 2 reports F 1 ), a welfare maximizing mechanism must allocate item 1 to player 1 and the remaining items to player 2. Yet player 1 can get higher expected value by reporting F 1 , and thus the mechanism is not truthful in expectation.
